Merge pull request #4444 from Infisical/fix/revert-lockout-login

feat: reverted lockout in login completely
This commit is contained in:
Sheen
2025-08-30 23:12:13 +08:00
committed by GitHub

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@@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ type TIdentityUaServiceFactoryDep = {
export type TIdentityUaServiceFactory = ReturnType<typeof identityUaServiceFactory>;
type LockoutObject = {
lockedOut: boolean;
failedAttempts: number;
};
// type LockoutObject = {
// lockedOut: boolean;
// failedAttempts: number;
// };
export const identityUaServiceFactory = ({
identityUaDAL,
@@ -62,8 +62,15 @@ export const identityUaServiceFactory = ({
const login = async (clientId: string, clientSecret: string, ip: string) => {
const identityUa = await identityUaDAL.findOne({ clientId });
if (!identityUa) {
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Invalid credentials"
throw new NotFoundError({
message: "No identity with specified client ID was found"
});
}
const identityMembershipOrg = await identityOrgMembershipDAL.findOne({ identityId: identityUa.identityId });
if (!identityMembershipOrg) {
throw new NotFoundError({
message: "No identity with the org membership was found"
});
}
@@ -71,119 +78,69 @@ export const identityUaServiceFactory = ({
ipAddress: ip,
trustedIps: identityUa.clientSecretTrustedIps as TIp[]
});
const clientSecretPrefix = clientSecret.slice(0, 4);
const clientSecrtInfo = await identityUaClientSecretDAL.find({
identityUAId: identityUa.id,
isClientSecretRevoked: false,
clientSecretPrefix
});
const LOCKOUT_KEY = `lockout:identity:${identityUa.identityId}:${IdentityAuthMethod.UNIVERSAL_AUTH}:${clientId}`;
let validClientSecretInfo: (typeof clientSecrtInfo)[0] | null = null;
for await (const info of clientSecrtInfo) {
const isMatch = await crypto.hashing().compareHash(clientSecret, info.clientSecretHash);
const identityMembershipOrg = await identityOrgMembershipDAL.findOne({ identityId: identityUa.identityId });
if (!identityMembershipOrg) {
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Invalid credentials"
});
if (isMatch) {
validClientSecretInfo = info;
break;
}
}
const identityTx = await identityUaDAL.transaction(async (tx) => {
// await tx.raw("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(?)", [PgSqlLock.IdentityLogin(identityUa.identityId, clientId)]);
if (!validClientSecretInfo) throw new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Invalid credentials" });
// Lockout Check
const lockoutRaw = await keyStore.getItem(LOCKOUT_KEY);
const { clientSecretTTL, clientSecretNumUses, clientSecretNumUsesLimit } = validClientSecretInfo;
if (Number(clientSecretTTL) > 0) {
const clientSecretCreated = new Date(validClientSecretInfo.createdAt);
const ttlInMilliseconds = Number(clientSecretTTL) * 1000;
const currentDate = new Date();
const expirationTime = new Date(clientSecretCreated.getTime() + ttlInMilliseconds);
let lockout: LockoutObject | undefined;
if (lockoutRaw) {
lockout = JSON.parse(lockoutRaw) as LockoutObject;
}
if (lockout && lockout.lockedOut) {
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "This identity auth method is temporarily locked, please try again later"
});
}
const clientSecretPrefix = clientSecret.slice(0, 4);
const clientSecretInfo = await identityUaClientSecretDAL.find({
identityUAId: identityUa.id,
isClientSecretRevoked: false,
clientSecretPrefix
});
let validClientSecretInfo: (typeof clientSecretInfo)[0] | null = null;
for await (const info of clientSecretInfo) {
const isMatch = await crypto.hashing().compareHash(clientSecret, info.clientSecretHash);
if (isMatch) {
validClientSecretInfo = info;
break;
}
}
if (!validClientSecretInfo) {
if (identityUa.lockoutEnabled) {
if (!lockout) {
lockout = {
lockedOut: false,
failedAttempts: 0
};
}
lockout.failedAttempts += 1;
if (lockout.failedAttempts >= identityUa.lockoutThreshold) {
lockout.lockedOut = true;
}
await keyStore.setItemWithExpiry(
LOCKOUT_KEY,
lockout.lockedOut ? identityUa.lockoutDurationSeconds : identityUa.lockoutCounterResetSeconds,
JSON.stringify(lockout)
);
}
throw new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Invalid credentials" });
} else if (lockout) {
await keyStore.deleteItem(LOCKOUT_KEY);
}
const { clientSecretTTL, clientSecretNumUses, clientSecretNumUsesLimit } = validClientSecretInfo;
if (Number(clientSecretTTL) > 0) {
const clientSecretCreated = new Date(validClientSecretInfo.createdAt);
const ttlInMilliseconds = Number(clientSecretTTL) * 1000;
const currentDate = new Date();
const expirationTime = new Date(clientSecretCreated.getTime() + ttlInMilliseconds);
if (currentDate > expirationTime) {
await identityUaClientSecretDAL.updateById(validClientSecretInfo.id, {
isClientSecretRevoked: true
});
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Access denied due to expired client secret"
});
}
}
if (clientSecretNumUsesLimit > 0 && clientSecretNumUses === clientSecretNumUsesLimit) {
// number of times client secret can be used for
// a login operation reached
if (currentDate > expirationTime) {
await identityUaClientSecretDAL.updateById(validClientSecretInfo.id, {
isClientSecretRevoked: true
});
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Access denied due to client secret usage limit reached"
message: "Access denied due to expired client secret"
});
}
}
const accessTokenTTLParams =
Number(identityUa.accessTokenPeriod) === 0
? {
accessTokenTTL: identityUa.accessTokenTTL,
accessTokenMaxTTL: identityUa.accessTokenMaxTTL
}
: {
accessTokenTTL: identityUa.accessTokenPeriod,
// We set a very large Max TTL for periodic tokens to ensure that clients (even outdated ones) can always renew their token
// without them having to update their SDKs, CLIs, etc. This workaround sets it to 30 years to emulate "forever"
accessTokenMaxTTL: 1000000000
};
if (clientSecretNumUsesLimit > 0 && clientSecretNumUses === clientSecretNumUsesLimit) {
// number of times client secret can be used for
// a login operation reached
await identityUaClientSecretDAL.updateById(validClientSecretInfo.id, {
isClientSecretRevoked: true
});
throw new UnauthorizedError({
message: "Access denied due to client secret usage limit reached"
});
}
const uaClientSecretDoc = await identityUaClientSecretDAL.incrementUsage(validClientSecretInfo.id, tx);
const accessTokenTTLParams =
Number(identityUa.accessTokenPeriod) === 0
? {
accessTokenTTL: identityUa.accessTokenTTL,
accessTokenMaxTTL: identityUa.accessTokenMaxTTL
}
: {
accessTokenTTL: identityUa.accessTokenPeriod,
// We set a very large Max TTL for periodic tokens to ensure that clients (even outdated ones) can always renew their token
// without them having to update their SDKs, CLIs, etc. This workaround sets it to 30 years to emulate "forever"
accessTokenMaxTTL: 1000000000
};
const identityAccessToken = await identityUaDAL.transaction(async (tx) => {
const uaClientSecretDoc = await identityUaClientSecretDAL.incrementUsage(validClientSecretInfo!.id, tx);
await identityOrgMembershipDAL.updateById(
identityMembershipOrg.id,
{
@@ -206,33 +163,33 @@ export const identityUaServiceFactory = ({
tx
);
return { newToken, validClientSecretInfo, accessTokenTTLParams };
return newToken;
});
const appCfg = getConfig();
const accessToken = crypto.jwt().sign(
{
identityId: identityUa.identityId,
clientSecretId: identityTx.validClientSecretInfo.id,
identityAccessTokenId: identityTx.newToken.id,
clientSecretId: validClientSecretInfo.id,
identityAccessTokenId: identityAccessToken.id,
authTokenType: AuthTokenType.IDENTITY_ACCESS_TOKEN
} as TIdentityAccessTokenJwtPayload,
appCfg.AUTH_SECRET,
// akhilmhdh: for non-expiry tokens you should not even set the value, including undefined. Even for undefined jsonwebtoken throws error
Number(identityTx.newToken.accessTokenTTL) === 0
Number(identityAccessToken.accessTokenTTL) === 0
? undefined
: {
expiresIn: Number(identityTx.newToken.accessTokenTTL)
expiresIn: Number(identityAccessToken.accessTokenTTL)
}
);
return {
accessToken,
identityUa,
validClientSecretInfo: identityTx.validClientSecretInfo,
identityAccessToken: identityTx.newToken,
validClientSecretInfo,
identityAccessToken,
identityMembershipOrg,
...identityTx.accessTokenTTLParams
...accessTokenTTLParams
};
};